On Voting

Voting on Majority Rules∗

We analyze an overlapping generations model of voting on “reform projects”. These resemble investments in that they first require some investment expenditure and later pay off. Since the time during which old people get the benefit is shorter, or because older people are more wealthy and hence pay more taxes, they are more conservative (against reforms) than young people. We show that if people...

Voting on Welfare Reform

This paper examines the influences on voting by members of the House of Representatives on the Carter Administration’s welfare reform legislation. The analysis finds some support for the hypothesis that voting by national legislators responded to the potential mobility of welfare recipients from low to high benefit states. Defining the public interest as promoting economic growth and the specia...

On Exiting After Voting

We consider the problem of a society whose members must choose from a …nite set of alternatives. After knowing the chosen alternative, members may reconsider their membership by either staying or exiting. In turn, and as a consequence of the exit of some of its members, other members might now …nd undesirable to belong to the society as well. For general exit procedures we analyze the exit beha...

A Note on Voting

A framework is presented in which to analyze the power of players in a cooperative game in which only certain coalitions are allowed. The allowable coalitions are characterized by a closure operator that combinatorially abstracts the notion of convexity. The Shapley-Shubik index is extended to this situation, allowing a computation of the power of each player. One example of this framework, vot...

On Electronic Voting Schemes