On uniquely implementing cooperation in the prisoners' dilemma
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Foundations for Cooperation in the Prisoners ’ Dilemma
We provide axiomatic foundations for a simple model of play in prisoners’ dilemma games. The model accommodates cooperation and suggests that players behave as if their expectations about their opponents’ behavior vary with their own choice. We refer to this nonstandard updating as magical thinking. The degree to which players exhibit magical thinking may be heterogeneous in the population and ...
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Recent research has analyzed how individual characteristics, like the exposure to different hormones and symmetry, affect decision-making and strategic behaviour. The present article investigates the effect of symmetry, of exposure to testosterone (T) in utero and during puberty and of current T on cooperation in a Prisoners' Dilemma Game (PDG). T is a hormone with well known effect on males' b...
متن کاملTheory of Mind Ability and Cooperation in the Prisoners Dilemma
The ability to accurately assess others’ intents, beliefs, and emotions – called Theory of Mind (ToM) – is conjectured to be important for social cooperation. We study the role of ToM ability in fostering cooperation in the simultaneous and sequential prisoners dilemma (PD) games. Our norm-based model predicts that high ToM ability individuals will believe in more cooperation and cooperate at h...
متن کاملSustaining Cooperation in the Repeated Prisoners Dilemma with Local Interaction
This paper studies the repeated prisoners dilemma in a local interaction setup. We construct a sequential equilibrium in pure strategies that sustains cooperation for sufficiently patient players. The notion of sequential equilibrium is extended to extensive form games with inÞnite time horizon. The strategy is embedded in an explicitly deÞned expectation system, which may also be viewed as a ...
متن کاملSupplement to Foundations for Cooperation in the Prisoners ’ Dilemma
We establish that in the Prisoners’ Dilemma, the model of Daley and Sadowski (2014) is logically distinct from three models that employ well-known forms of otherregarding preferences: altruism (Ledyard, 1995; Levine, 1998), inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), and reciprocity (Rabin, 1993). S.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory
سال: 1997
ISSN: 0938-2259,1432-0479
DOI: 10.1007/bf01213809