On the Stable Matchings That Can Be Reached When the Agents Go Marching in One By One

On the Stable Matchings That Can Be Reached When the Agents Go Marching in One By One

The Random Order Mechanism (ROM) can be thought of as a sequential version of Gale and Shapley’s deferred-acceptance (DA) algorithm where agents are arriving one at a time, and each newly arrived agent has an opportunity to propose. Like the DA algorithm, ROM can be implemented in polynomial time. Unlike the DA algorithm, it is possible for ROM to output a stable matching that is different from...

When the saints go marching on.

Having worked as a specialty doctor in palliative care for the past 6 years and now returning to general practice, I have become increasingly uncertain as to the future role of in-patient hospices. Perhaps the time has come for a realistic look at where exactly they fit in to the bigger picture of end-of-life care. Of particular concern is whether their existence inhibits the development of oth...

Single Agents and the Set of Many-to-One Stable Matchings

Some properties of the set of many-to-one stable matchings for firms that have responsive preferences and quotas are not necessarily true when firms' preferences are substitutable. In particular, we provide examples in which firms have substitutable preferences but firms and workers may be ``single'' in one stable matching and matched in another one. We identify a set of axioms on firms' prefer...

Can the sphenopalatine ganglion be reached by an acupuncture needle?

Can Anyone Be “ The ” One ? Field

Much empirical evidence shows that female and male partners look alike along a variety of attributes. It is however unclear whether this positive sorting is the result of either assortative or agreed-upon preferences or of meeting opportunities. We assess the nature of dating preferences and the relative importance of preferences and opportunities in dating behavior using unique new data from a...