On the stable marriage polytope

The stable admissions polytope

The stable admissions polytope – the convex hull of the stable assignments of the university admissions problem – is described by a set of linear inequalities. It depends on a new characterization of stability and arguments that exploit and extend a graphical approach that has been fruitful in the analysis of the stable marriage problem.

On the stable b-matching polytope

We characterize the bipartite stable b-matching polytope in terms of linear constraints. The stable b-matching polytope is the convex hull of the characteristic vectors of stable b-matchings, that is, of stable assignments of a two-sided multiple partner matching model. Our proof uses the comparability theorem of Roth and Sotomayor [13] and follows a similar line as Rothblum did in [14] for the...

On Treewidth and Stable Marriage

Stable Marriage is a fundamental problem to both computer science and economics. Four well-known NP-hard optimization versions of this problem are the Sex-Equal Stable Marriage (SESM), Balanced Stable Marriage (BSM), max-Stable Marriage with Ties (max-SMT) and min-Stable Marriage with Ties (min-SMT) problems. In this paper, we analyze these problems from the viewpoint of Parameterized Complexit...

On the Multidimensional Stable Marriage Problem

We provide a problem definition of the stable marriage problem for a general number of parties p under a natural preference scheme in which each person has simple lists for the other parties. We extend the notion of stability in a natural way and present so called elemental and compound algorithms to generate matchings for a problem instance. We demonstrate the stability of matchings generated ...

The Stable Marriage Problem