On the Security of Keyed-Homomorphic PKE: Preventing Key Recovery Attacks and Ciphertext Validity Attacks

نویسندگان

چکیده

In this short note, we formally show that Keyed-Homomorphic Public Key Encryption (KH-PKE) is secure against key recovery attacks and ciphertext validity have been introduced as chosen-ciphertext for homomorphic encryption.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences

سال: 2021

ISSN: ['1745-1337', '0916-8508']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1587/transfun.2020eal2039