On the revealed preference analysis of stable aggregate matchings

نویسندگان

چکیده

Echenique, Lee, Shum, and Yenmez (2013) established the testable revealed preference restrictions for stable aggregate matching with transferable nontransferable utility extremal matchings. In this paper, we rephrase their in terms of properties on a corresponding bipartite graph. From this, obtain simple condition that verifies whether given is rationalizable. For matchings are not rationalizable, provide greedy algorithm computes minimum number matches need to be removed rationalizable matching. We also show related problem finding types remove order NP‐complete.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Economics

سال: 2022

ISSN: ['1555-7561', '1933-6837']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.3982/te4723