On the open-loop Nash equilibrium in LQ-games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A Note on Open Loop Nash Equilibrium in Linear-State Differential Games
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
سال: 1998
ISSN: 0165-1889
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-1889(97)00084-5