On the nucleolus of neighbor games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On the nucleolus of neighbor games
Assignment problems are well-known problems in practice. We mention house markets, job markets, and production planning. The games of interest in this paper, the neighbor games, arise from a special class of assignment problems. We focus on the nucleolus [D. Schmeidler, SIAM J. Appl. Math. 17 (1969) 1163–1170], one of the most prominent core solutions. A core solution is interesting with respec...
متن کاملOn the Nucleolus of Neighbour Games
The class of neighbour games is the intersection of the class of assignment games (cf. Shapley and Shubik (1972)) and the class of component additive games (cf. Curiel et al. (1994)). For assignment games and component additive games there exist polynomially bounded algorithms of order p for calculating the nucleolus, where p is the number of players. In this paper we present a polynomially bou...
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Members of a shareholder meeting or legislative committee have greater or smaller voting power than meets the eye if the nucleolus of the induced majority game di ers from the voting weight distribution. We establish a new su cient condition for the weight and power distributions to be equal; and we characterize the limit behavior of the nucleolus in case all relative weights become small. JEL ...
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Weighted voting games (WVG) are coalitional games in which an agent’s contribution to a coalition is given by his weight, and a coalition wins if its total weight meets or exceeds a given quota. These games model decision-making in political bodies as well as collaboration and surplus division in multiagent domains. The computational complexity of various solution concepts for weighted voting g...
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We introduce directed acyclic graph (DAG) games, a generalization of standard tree games, to study cost sharing on networks. This structure has not been previously analyzed from a cooperative game theoretic perspective. Every monotonic and subadditive cost game – including monotonic minimum cost spanning tree games – can be modeled as a DAG-game. We provide an efficiently verifiable condition s...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: European Journal of Operational Research
سال: 2003
ISSN: 0377-2217
DOI: 10.1016/s0377-2217(02)00240-0