On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games
This paper provides a dual characterization of the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games (in particular, repeated games) as the discount factor tends to one. As a first corollary, the folk theorems of Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994), Kandori and Matsushima (1998) and Hörner, Sugaya, Takahashi and Vieille (2011) obtain. As a second corollary, in the context of r...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2005713