On the Informed Principal Model with Common Values
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values
In a class of informed principal problems with common values, we define iteratively a particular allocation which we call the assured allocation. It is comparatively easy to calculate and straightforward to interpret. It always exists, is unique and continuous in the priors. It is undominated, i.e. effi cient among the different types of the principal subject to the agent’s interim participatio...
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We provide a solution to the problem of mechanism selection by a privately informed principal in generalized-private-value environments. In a broad class of these environments, the mechanism-selection game has a perfect-Bayesian equilibrium that has a strong neologismproofness property. Equilibrium allocations satisfying this property are characterized in terms of the players’ incentive and par...
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We show that, in environments with independent private values and transferable utility, a privately informed principal can solve her mechanism selection problem by implementing an allocation that is ex-ante optimal for her. No type of the principal can gain from proposing an alternative mechanism that is incentivefeasible with any belief that puts probability 0 on types that would strictly lose...
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In the paper [L] a project for proving the existence of transfer factors for forms of SL(3), especially for the unitary groups studied by Rogawski, was begun, and it was promised that it would be completed by the present authors. Their paper is still in the course of being written, but the present essay can serve as an introduction to it. It deals with SL(2) which has, of course, already been d...
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It has been shown by Maskin and Tirole (1990, proposition 11) that with quasi-linear preferences and private values, an informed principal neither gains nor loses if her private information is revealed before contracting takes place. The note shows that this result may not hold when the agent faces countervailing incentives.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2017
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2844942