On the influence of extreme parties in electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
On the influence of extreme parties in electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates
On the Influence of Extreme Parties in Electoral Competition with Policy-Motivated Candidates* We study and compare equilibrium platforms in models of one-dimensional electoral competition with two and four policy-motivated parties. We first analyse the plurality game, where the party that gets the most votes is elected and implements its proposed platform. Restrictions on the set of credible a...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2005
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-005-0019-5