On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play

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چکیده

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Econometrica

سال: 2002

ISSN: 0012-9682,1468-0262

DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2002.00440.x