On the generic robustness of solution concepts to incomplete information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Approximate robustness of equilibrium to incomplete information
We relax the Kajii and Morris (1997a) notion of equilibrium robustness by allowing approximate equilibria in close incomplete information games. The new notion is termed approximate robustness. The approximately robust equilibrium correspondence turns out to be upper hemicontinuous, unlike the (exactly) robust equilibrium correspondence. As a corollary of the upper hemicontinuity, it is shown...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Mathematical Economics
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0304-4068
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.12.003