On the $$\gamma $$-core of asymmetric aggregative games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theory and Decision
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0040-5833,1573-7187
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-019-09733-4