On the Existence of Nash Equilibria in Asymmetric Sporting Contests with Managerial Efficiency

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Game Theory

سال: 2013

ISSN: 2325-0046

DOI: 10.5923/j.jgt.20120105.01