ON THE COMPLETE INFORMATION FIRST-PRICE AUCTION AND ITS INTUITIVE SOLUTION
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On the Complete Information First-Price Auction and its Intuitive Solution
Despite the popularity of auction theoretical thinking, it appears that no one has presented an elementary equilibrium analysis of the complete information rstprice sealed-bid auction mechanism when the bidding space has a nite grid. This paper aims to remedy that omission. We show that there always exists a high price equilibriumwhich can be considered the intuitive solution(an agent wit...
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We study how the structure of information can affect welfare outcomes in the first price auction. For a fixed distribution of buyers’ valuations, we consider all of the Bayesian equilibria in weakly undominated strategies that could arise under different specifications of the buyers’ higher-order beliefs, as long as those beliefs are consistent with a common prior and the given prior distributi...
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This paper endogenizes bidders’ beliefs about their competition in a symmetric first-price auction with independent private values, by allowing bidders to decide whether to participate publicly or secretly. When public participation is more costly, bidders only participate secretly in the unique equilibrium. By contrast, when secret participation is slightly more costly, all symmetric equilibri...
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We study in the laboratory a series of first price sealed bid auctions of a common value good. Bidders face three types of information: private information, public information and common uncertainty. Auctions are characterized by the relative size of these three information elements. Half of our subjects bid differently depending on whether the last piece of information obtained is private or p...
متن کاملSecure first-price sealed-bid auction scheme
In modern times, people have paid more attention to their private information. The data confidentiality is very important in many economic aspects. In this paper, we proposed a secure auction system, in which the bids will not be revealed, and no one can fake the winning identity and the winner cannot change the winning bid. The communication cost of our scheme is low; only two rounds communica...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Game Theory Review
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0219-1989,1793-6675
DOI: 10.1142/s0219198911003040