On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin (1980)) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked pre...
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In voting problems where agents have well behaved (Lipschitz continuous) utility functions on a multidimensional space of alternatives, a voting rule is threshold strategy-proof if any agent can only obtain a limited utility gain by not voting for a most preferred alternative, given that the number of agents is large enough. For anonymous voting rules it is shown that this condition is not only...
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Participatory budgeting [1], which started in South America, is now gaining popularity in the US, with cities like San Francisco, Vallejo, Boston, Chicago and New York adopting this paradigm [6]. With decisions involving millions of dollars across the nation being made this way, a question arises as to how to design voting schemes to aggregate the voters’ preferences into a meaningful budget de...
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Merging operators aim at defining the beliefs/goals of a group of agents from the beliefs/goals of each member of the group. Whenever an agent of the group has preferences over the possible results of the merging process (i.e. the possible merged bases), she can try to rig the merging process by lying on her true beliefs/goals if this leads to a better merged base according to her point of view...
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Voting theory provides useful insights for multiagent preference aggregation. However, the standard setting assumes totally ordered preferences, as well as a ballot language that coincides with the preference language. In typical AI scenarios, these assumptions do not hold: certain alternatives may be incomparable for some agents, and others may have their preferences encoded in a format that i...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-020-00728-y