On social welfare orders satisfying anonymity and asymptotic density-one Pareto

نویسندگان

چکیده

We study the nature (constructive versus non-constructive) and issue of real-valued representability social welfare orders, on set infinite utility streams, satisfying anonymity asymptotic density-one Pareto axioms. characterize existence representable constructive orders (fulfilling aforementioned axioms) in terms easily verifiable conditions feasible one-period utilities, denoted by Y ⊂ R : a order is admits explicit description if only contains finitely many elements. • introduce version ordering, called (ADP). (SWO) that satisfy (AN) ADP. SWO AN Existence equivalent to utilities being finite.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical Social Sciences

سال: 2021

ISSN: ['1879-3118', '0165-4896']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.03.002