On Social Optimal Routing Under Selfish Learning
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Selfish Routing in Social Networks
I investigate the intersection of selfish routing and the preferential attachment social network. In particular, through the use of a stochastic generative preferential attachment model, a collection abstract network patterns are created for the transfer of flow from one distinct source destination vertex pair. Then, using a linear approximation method, I calculate both Nash and system optimal ...
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Selfish routing is one of the most studied problems in algorithmic game theory, with one of the principal applications being that of routing in road networks. The majority of related work, in the many variants of the problem, deals with the inefficiency of equilibria to which users are assumed to converge. Multiple mechanisms for improving the outcomes at equilibria have been considered, such a...
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We study the repeated, non-atomic routing game, in which selfish players make a sequence of routing decisions. We consider a model in which players use regret-minimizing algorithms as the learning mechanism, and study the resulting dynamics. We are concerned in particular with the convergence to the set of Nash equilibria of the routing game. No-regret learning algorithms are known to guarantee...
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Selfish routing on dynamic flows over time is used to model scenarios that vary with time in which individual agents act in their best interest. In this paper we provide a survey of a particular dynamic model, the deterministic queuing model, and discuss how the model can be adjusted and applied to different real-life scenarios. We then examine how these adjustments affect the computability, op...
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In large-scale communication networks, like the Internet, it is usually impossible to globally manage network traffic. In the absence of global control it is typically assumed in traffic modeling that network users follow the most rational approach, that is, they behave selfishly to optimize their own individual welfare. This motivates the analysis of network traffic using models from Game Theo...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems
سال: 2018
ISSN: 2325-5870
DOI: 10.1109/tcns.2016.2619910