On Reachable Assignments Under Dichotomous Preferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
We consider the problem of determining whether a target item assignment can be reached from an initial by sequence pairwise exchanges items between agents. In particular, we situation where each agent has dichotomous preference over items, that is, evaluates as acceptable or unacceptable. Furthermore, assume communication agents is limited, and relationship represented undirected graph. Then, pair exchange their only if they are connected edge involved acceptable. prove this $$\textsf{PSPACE}$$ -complete even when graph complete (that every items), solved in polynomial time input tree.
منابع مشابه
Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
Agents partition deterministic outcomes into good or bad. A direct revelation mechanism selects a lottery over outcomes — also interpreted as time-shares. Under such dichotomous preferences, the probability that the lottery outcome be a good one is a canonical utility representation. The utilitarian mechanism averages over all deterministic outcomes “approved” by the largest number of agents. I...
متن کاملMultilateral Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
For any multilateral matching problem with dichotomous preferences, in the sense that agents are indifferent between all acceptable teams, there exist some strategy proof, individually rational and efficient mechanisms. Moreover some random matching mechanisms simultaneously satisfy the three crucial desiderata of mechanism design: efficiency, fairness and strategyproofness, which typically con...
متن کاملApproval Voting on Dichotomous Preferences
The aim of this paper is to find normative foundations of Approval Voting.In order to show that Approval Voting is the only social choice functionthat satisfies anonymity, neutrality, strategy-proofness and strict mono-tonicity we rely on an intermediate result which relates strategy-proofnessof a social choice function to the properties of Independence of IrrelevantAlte...
متن کاملMechanisms for House Allocation with Existing Tenants under Dichotomous Preferences
We consider house allocation with existing tenants in which each agent has dichotomous preferences. We present strategyproof, polynomial-time, and (strongly) individually rational algorithms that satisfy the maximum number of agents. For the endowment only model, one of the algorithms also returns a core-stable allocation.
متن کاملStructure in Dichotomous Preferences
Many hard computational social choice problems are known to become tractable when voters’ preferences belong to a restricted domain, such as those of singlepeaked or single-crossing preferences. However, to date, all algorithmic results of this type have been obtained for the setting where each voter’s preference list is a total order of candidates. The goal of this paper is to extend this line...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1611-3349', '0302-9743']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21203-1_43