On Poisoned Wardrop Equilibrium in Congestion Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
Recent years have witnessed a growing number of attack vectors against increasingly interconnected traffic networks. Informational attacks emerged as the prominent ones that aim to poison data, misguide users, and manipulate patterns. To study impact this class attacks, we propose game-theoretic framework where attacker, Stackelberg leader, falsifies conditions change pattern predicted by Wardrop equilibrium, achieved or followers. The intended shift equilibrium is consequence strategic informational poisoning. Leveraging sensitivity analysis, quantify system-level characterizing concept poisoned Price Anarchy, which compares its non-poisoned system optimal counterpart. We use an evacuation case show can be found through two-time scale zeroth-order learning process demonstrate disruptive effects poisoning, indicating compelling need for defense policies mitigate such security threats.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
سال: 2023
ISSN: ['1611-3349', '0302-9743']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-26369-9_10