On optimal multidimensional mechanism design
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Lectures on Optimal Mechanism Design
These lecture notes cover the second third of the class CS364B, Topics in Algorithmic Game Theory, offered at Stanford University in the Fall 2005 term. They cover the topic of optimal mechanism design. As this is a traditional economic objective, we will review the Economics treatment of optimal mechanism design first before moving on to cover recent work on the problem from the theoretical co...
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We efficiently solve the optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design problem for independentbidders with arbitrary demand constraints when either the number of bidders is a constantor the number of items is a constant. In the first setting, we need that each bidder’s valuesfor the items are sampled from a possibly correlated, item-symmetric distribution, allowingdifferent distrib...
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The optimal allocation of resources in complex environments—like allocation of dynamic wireless spectrum, cloud computing services, and Internet advertising—is computationally challenging even given the true preferences of the participants. In the theory and practice of optimization in complex environments, a wide variety of special and general purpose algorithms have been developed; these algo...
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We study an adverse selection model in which a principal will allocate a set of nonidentical objects among privately informed agents. Combinatorial auctions provide an important class of examples. Agents have private information that is parametrized by a one dimensional type. The principal collects type reports from the agents, computes their valuations for di¤erent sets, and then decides on an...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: ACM SIGecom Exchanges
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1551-9031,1551-9031
DOI: 10.1145/1998549.1998555