On Joan Robinson’s Output Symmetry Theorems with Various Taxations under Third-Degree Price Discrimination: A Generalization

نویسندگان

چکیده

This paper incorporates more general cases with a new class of constantly adjusted concavity demand curves and includes three types taxes. To verify the output symmetry under various forms taxation, we simulate both linear constant elasticity functions unit, ad valorem, cost valorem If all in submarkets are linear, total outputs identical uniform pricing third-degree price discrimination. Furthermore, if weak market strictly “Robinson-concave” strong “Robinson-convex” or then discrimination exceeds that pricing, vice versa. While different taxes lead to higher costs, pass-through changes prices products, change still depends on curvature curve. Therefore, curve remains main determinant output. Our study provides theoretical basis for intervention

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Symmetry

سال: 2022

ISSN: ['0865-4824', '2226-1877']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/sym14050959