ON GAMES OF PERFECT INFORMATION: EQUILIBRIA, ε–EQUILIBRIA AND APPROXIMATION BY SIMPLE GAMES
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On Games of Perfect Information: Equilibria, ε-Equilibria and Approximation by Simple Games
We show that every bounded, continuous at infinity game of perfect information has an ε−perfect equilibrium. Our method consists of approximating the payoff function of each player by a sequence of simple functions, and to consider the corresponding sequence of games, each differing form the original game only on the payoff function. In addition, this approach yields a new characterization of p...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Game Theory Review
سال: 2005
ISSN: 0219-1989,1793-6675
DOI: 10.1142/s0219198905000661