On evolutionary spatial heterogeneous games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Non-local interactions in spatial evolutionary games
As a special case of symmetric game in which the players share a common payoff matrix, evolutionary game provides a suitable approach to model and explore the emergence of cooperative behavior in natural and social systems. The evolutionary spatial game (ESG) further specifies the payoff for each individual by both the payoff matrix M and the spatial dependence structure of the population on a ...
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Here we will use results of Cox, Durrett, and Perkins [56] for voter model perturbations to study spatial evolutionary games on Zd, d ≥ 3 when the interaction kernel is finite range, symmetric, and has covariance matrix σ2I. The games we consider have payoff matrices of the form 1 + wG where 1 is matrix of all 1’s and w is small and positive. Since our population size N = ∞, we call our selecti...
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We consider the lifetimes of metastable states in bistable evolutionary games (coordination games), and examine how they are affected by spatial structure. A semiclassical approximation based on a path integral method is applied to stochastic evolutionary game dynamics with and without spatial structure, and the lifetimes of the metastable states are evaluated. It is shown that the population d...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0378-4371
DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2007.11.001