منابع مشابه
Revenue Maximizing Envy-Free Pricing in Matching Markets with Budgets
We study envy-free pricing mechanisms in matching markets with m items and n budget constrained buyers. Each buyer is interested in a subset of the items on sale, and she appraises at some single-value every item in her preference-set. Moreover, each buyer has a budget that constraints the maximum affordable payment, while she aims to obtain as many items as possible of her preference-set. Our ...
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متن کاملEnvy-Free Makespan Approximation
We study envy-free mechanisms for assigning tasks to agents, where every task may take a different amount of time to perform by each agent, and the goal is to get all the tasks done as soon as possible (i.e., minimize the makespan). For indivisible tasks, we put forward an envy-free polynomial mechanism that approximates the minimal makespan to within a factor ofO(logm), wherem is the number of...
متن کاملMore than Envy-Free
There have been several interesting results in the literature on dividing up goods between self-interested parties such that the allocation is envy-free (Brams Taylor 1996). An allocation is deemed envy-free when every party (agent) believes that its share is not less than anyone else’s share. These procedures, however, are not efficient (in the sense of pareto optimality) general. Envy-free pr...
متن کاملOn Multi-dimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms
We study the problem of fairness design. Specifically, we focus on approximation algorithms for indivisible items with supporting envy-free bundle prices. We present the first polynomial-communication envy-free profit-maximizing combinatorial auctions for general bidders. In this context, envy-free prices can be interpreted as anonymous nondiscriminatory prices. Additionally, we study the canon...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Discrete Applied Mathematics
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0166-218X
DOI: 10.1016/j.dam.2018.03.034