On efficient computation of equilibrium under social coalition structures
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: TURKISH JOURNAL OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING & COMPUTER SCIENCES
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1303-6203
DOI: 10.3906/elk-1910-164