On designing truthful mechanisms for online scheduling
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On Designing Truthful Mechanisms for Online Scheduling
We study the online version of the scheduling problem Q||Cmax involving selfish agents, considered by Archer and Tardos in [FOCS 2001], where jobs must be scheduled on m related machines, each of them owned by a different selfish agent. We present a general technique for transforming competitive online algorithms for Q||Cmax into truthful online mechanisms with a small loss of competitiveness. ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Computer Science
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0304-3975
DOI: 10.1016/j.tcs.2008.12.057