On demand responsiveness in additive cost sharing
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On demand responsiveness in additive cost sharing
We propose two new axioms of demand responsiveness for additive cost sharing with variable demands. Group Monotonicity requires that if a group of agents increase their demands, not all of them pay less. Solidarity says that if agent i demands more, j should not pay more if k pays less. Both axioms are compatible in the partial responsibility theory postulating Strong Ranking, i.e., the ranking...
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Using a new representation theorem for additive cost sharing methods as sums of path methods, we show that many of the standard additive cost sharing methods (Aumann-Shapley, Shapley Shubik, and Serial Cost) are consistent. These results follow directly from a simple suucient condition for consistency: being generated by associative paths, which can be used to show consistency for many other me...
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The set of additive cost sharing methods when individual demands are integer valued and cost shares are non negative, is characterized by its extreme points and by a network flow representation. The extreme methods allocate costs incrementally along a chain of demand vectors independent of the cost function. The result generalizes Wang’s characterization in that we do not assume the Dummy axiom.
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Using a new representation theorem for additive cost sharing methods as sums of path methods, we show that many of the standard additive cost sharing methods (Aumann-Shapley, Shapley Shubik, and Serial Cost) are consistent. These results follow directly from a simple su cient condition for consistency: being generated by associative paths, which can be used to show consistency for many other me...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2005
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.05.003