On Competitive Equilibria with Asymmetric Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Competitive Equilibria with Asymmetric Information
This paper studies competitive equilibria in economies where agents trade in markets for standardized, non-exclusive financial contracts, under conditions of asymmetric information (both of the moral hazard and the adverse selection type). The problems for the existence of competitive equilibria in this framework are identified, and shown to be essentially the same under different forms of asym...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1935-1704,2194-6124
DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1385