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Monotonicity and Incentive Compatibility
Understanding multi-dimensional mechanism design. 1 The Model Let M = {1, . . . , m} be a finite set of agents. Every agent has private information, which can be multi-dimensional. This is called his type. The space from which an agent draws his type is called his type space. Let Ti denote the type space of agent i ∈ M . We assume Ti ⊆ R n for some integer n ≥ 1. Let T m = ×mi=1Ti. Also, denote...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Review of Economic Studies
سال: 1979
ISSN: 0034-6527
DOI: 10.2307/2297048