On Best-Response Bidding in GSP Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On Best-Response Bidding in GSP Auctions
How should players bid in keyword auctions such as those used by Google, Yahoo! and MSN? We model ad auctions as a dynamic game of incomplete information, so we can study the convergence and robustness properties of various strategies. In particular, we consider best-response bidding strategies for a repeated auction on a single keyword, where in each round, each player chooses some optimal bid...
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In a combinatorial auction with item bidding, agents participate in multiple single-itemsecond-price auctions at once. As some items might be substitutes, agents need to strategize inorder to maximize their utilities. A number of results indicate that high welfare can be achievedthis way, giving bounds on the welfare at equilibrium. Recently, however, criticism has beenraise...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1087990