On balanced games with infinitely many players: Revisiting Schmeidler's result

Values of Games with Infinitely Many Players

∗Institute of Mathematics; and Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory; The Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Givat Ram; Jerusalem 91904; Israel. E-mail: [email protected] This research was in part supported by The Israel Science Foundation grant 382/98. J.E.L. Classification numbers. D70, D71, D63, C71

Stochastic games with infinitely many interacting agents

We introduce and study a class of infinite-horizon non-zero-sum non-cooperative stochastic games with infinitely many interacting agents using ideas of statistical mechanics. First we show, in the general case of asymmetric interactions, the existence of a strategy that allows any player to eliminate losses after a finite random time. In the special case of symmetric interactions, we also prove...

Positional Determinacy of Games with Infinitely Many

We study two-player games of infinite duration that are played on finite or infinite game graphs. A winning strategy for such a game is positional if it only depends on the current position, and not on the history of the play. A game is positionally determined if, from each position, one of the two players has a positional winning strategy. The theory of such games is well studied for winning c...

Behavioral conformity in games with many players

In the literature of psychology and economics it is frequently observed that individuals tend to conform in their behavior to the behavior of similar individuals. A fundamental question is whether the outcome of such behavior can be consistent with self-interest. We propose that this consistency requires the existence of a Nash or approximate Nash equilibrium that induces a partition of the pla...

Non-Cooperative Games with Many Players∗