On $$\alpha $$-constant-sum games
نویسندگان
چکیده
Given any $$\alpha \in [0,1]$$ , an $$ -constant-sum game (abbreviated as -CS game) on a finite set of players, N, is function that assigns real number to coalition $$S\subseteq N$$ such the sum worth S and its complementary $$N\backslash S$$ times grand coalition. This class contains constant-sum games Khmelnitskaya (Int J Game Theory 32:223–227, 2003) (for = 1$$ ) threats (Kohlberg Neyman, Games Econ Behav 108:139–145, 2018) 0$$ special cases. An may not be classical TU cooperative it fail satisfy condition empty 0, except when =1$$ . In this paper, we (i) extend -quasi-Shapley value giving Shapley for quasi-Shapley-value threat games, (ii) axiomatizations (2003) Kohlberg Neyman (2018) (iii) introduce new efficiency axiom which, together with other axioms, characterizes solution defined by exactly formula games.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1432-1270', '0020-7276']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-021-00792-y