On a Continuous-Time Game with Incomplete Information

نویسندگان
چکیده

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

On a Continuous-Time Game with Incomplete Information

For zero-sum two-player continuous-time games with integral payoff and incomplete information on one side, one shows that the optimal strategy of the informed player can be computed through an auxiliary optimization problem over some martingale measures. One also characterizes the optimal martingale measures and compute it explicitely in several examples.

متن کامل

On a Markov Game with Incomplete Information

We consider an example of a Markov game with lack of information on one side, that was first introduced by Renault (2002). We compute both the value and optimal strategies for a range of parameter values. ∗MEDS Department, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, and Département Finance et Economie, HEC, 1, rue de la Libération, 78 351 Jouy-en-Josas, France. e-mail: j-horner@kello...

متن کامل

ON A MARKOV GAME WITH ONE-SIDED INCOMPLETE INFORMATION By

We apply the average cost optimality equation to zero-sum Markov games, by considering a simple game with one-sided incomplete information that generalizes an example of Aumann and Maschler (1995). We determine the value and identify the optimal strategies for a range of parameters.

متن کامل

Games with Incomplete Information in Continuous Time and for Continuous Types

We consider a two-player zero-sum game with integral payoff and with incomplete information on one side, where the payoff is chosen among a continuous set of possible payoffs. We prove that the value function of this game is solution of an auxiliary optimization problem over a set of measure-valued processes. Then we use this equivalent formulation to characterize the value function as the visc...

متن کامل

A game theoretical model of kleptoparasitism with incomplete information.

Kleptoparasitism, the stealing of food from one animal by another, is a common natural phenomenon that has been modelled mathematically in a number of ways. The handling process of food items can take some time and the value of such items can vary depending upon how much handling an item has received. Furthermore this information may be known to the handler but not the potential challenger, so ...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Mathematics of Operations Research

سال: 2009

ISSN: 0364-765X,1526-5471

DOI: 10.1287/moor.1090.0414