Omissions and Byproducts across Moral Domains
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Omissions and Byproducts across Moral Domains
Research indicates that moral violations are judged less wrong when the violation results from omission as opposed to commission, and when the violation is a byproduct as opposed to a means to an end. Previous work examined these effects mainly for violent offenses such as killing. Here we investigate the generality of these effects across a range of moral violations including sexuality, food, ...
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3 Omission, action, and related issues 4 3.1 Determinants of omission bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1.1 Perceived causality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1.2 Physical proximity, contact, and personal force . . . . . . 6 3.1.3 Protected values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.2 Related biases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
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People make inferences about the actions of others, assessing whether an act is best explained by person-based versus situation-based accounts. Here we examine people's explanations for norm violations in different domains: harmful acts (e.g., assault) and impure acts (e.g., incest). Across four studies, we find evidence for an attribution asymmetry: people endorse more person-based attribution...
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A key factor in legal and moral judgments is intent. Intent differentiates, for instance, murder from manslaughter. Is this true for all moral judgments? People deliver moral judgments of many kinds of actions, including harmful actions (e.g., assault) and purity violations (e.g., incest, consuming taboo substances). We show that intent is a key factor for moral judgments of harm, but less of a...
متن کاملOmissions and Causalism∗
Omissions are puzzling, so puzzling that people tend to say puzzling things about them and give up otherwise attractive philosophical theories in order to accommodate them.1 In this paper I suggest that omissions make trouble—serious trouble, and trouble of a new, sui generis kind—for “causalism,” the standard view or family of views of agency. In particular, I am interested in causalism as an ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: PLoS ONE
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1932-6203
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0046963