Oligopoly games with and without transferable technologies
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Oligopoly games with and without transferable technologies
In this paper standard oligopolies are interpreted in two ways, namely as oligopolies without transferable technologies and as oligopolies with transferable technologies. From a cooperative point of view this leads to two diierent classes of cooperative games. We show that cooperative oligopoly games without transferable technologies are convex games and that cooperative oligopoly games with tr...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical Social Sciences
سال: 2002
ISSN: 0165-4896
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-4896(01)00091-9