منابع مشابه
Dynamic Belief Elicitation∗
At t = 1, an expert has (probabilistic) information about a random outcome X. The expert obtains further information as time passes, up to t = N at which X is publicly revealed. (How) Can a protocol be devised that induces the expert, as a strict best response, to reveal at the outset his prior assessment of both X and the information flows he anticipates and, subsequently, what information he ...
متن کاملLearning and Belief Elicitation: Observer Effects
This paper asks a simple methodological question about belief elicitation: Does asking subjects about their beliefs during a repeated game change the way subjects play the game? In particular, we ask if belief elicitation changes behavior in the direction of belief based learning models, away from reinforcement learning models. Based on a carefully designed laboratory experiment, we show that p...
متن کاملSupplementary Appendix to “ Dynamic Belief Elicitation ”
This Supplementary Appendix includes additional results and the proofs omitted from the main text. Throughout, references are to the main text and to the appendix of the main text, unless they include the prefix “SA.” It proceeds as follows. In Section SA.1, we provide several examples that illustrate the general method of the main text to special environments. In Section SA.2, we consider the ...
متن کاملElicitation of Expert Opinions for Constructing Belief Functions
This paper presents a method for constructing belief functions from elicited expert opinions expressed in terms of qualitative preference relations. These preferences are transformed into constraints of an optimization problem whose resolution allows the generation of the least informative belief functions according to some uncertainty measures. Mono-objective and Multiobjective optimization te...
متن کاملBelief Elicitation in Experiments: Is there a Hedging Problem?
Belief Elicitation in Experiments: Is there a Hedging Problem? Belief elicitation in economics experiments usually relies on paying subjects according to the accuracy of stated beliefs in addition to payments for other decisions. Such incentives, however, allow risk-averse subjects to hedge with their stated beliefs against adverse outcomes of other decisions in the experiment. This raises two ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.002