OBSERVABLE REPUTATION TRADING
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Observable Reputation Trading
Is the reputation of a firm tradable when the change in ownership is observable? We consider a competitive market in which a share of owners must retire in each period. New owners bid for the firms that are for sale. Customers learn the owner’s type, which reflects the quality of the good or service provided, through experience. After observing an ownership change they may want to switch firm. ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Economic Review
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0020-6598,1468-2354
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00442.x