Note—Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric Information Reanalyzed
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Competitive Bidding with Disparate Information
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We consider the problem of repeated bidding in online advertising auctions when some side information (e.g. browser cookies) is available ahead of submitting a bid in the form of a d-dimensional vector. The goal for the advertiser is to maximize the total utility (e.g. the total number of clicks) derived from displaying ads given that a limited budget B is allocated for a given time horizon T ....
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Because of the increasing sophistication of Internet auctions, a user can participate in many different auctions held around the world, each of which offers a wide variety of items. In this paper, we present multiple-bidding support framework based on multiagent system, which can support bidding and browsing information. To extract information on items from real-life Internet auction sites, we ...
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This paper studies competitive equilibria in economies where agents trade in markets for standardized, non-exclusive financial contracts, under conditions of asymmetric information (both of the moral hazard and the adverse selection type). The problems for the existence of competitive equilibria in this framework are identified, and shown to be essentially the same under different forms of asym...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Management Science
سال: 1979
ISSN: 0025-1909,1526-5501
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.25.3.291