Normativity, Realism and Emotional Experience
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Realism and the Nature of Perceptual Experience
Realism concerning a given domain of things is the view that the things in that domain exist, and are as they are, quite independently of anyone’s thought or experience of them. The realism which I am concerned with here is empirical realism, that is, realism concerning empirical things, which are the ordinary persisting things presented to us in our perception of the world around us. Empirical...
متن کاملEmotional Experience
Introduction People often carve experience into affective or emotional moments (Barrett, 2006; James, 1884). From queasy sensations in the stomach or the flush of the face to the flash of lightening or smell of vomit, these perceptions are often understood as feeling discrete emotions such as 'humiliation,' 'excitement,' or 'disgust' or perhaps more simply as 'pleasant' or 'unpleasant' affectiv...
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I argue that the possibility of non-perceptual experience need not compel a naïve realist to adopt a disjunctive conception of experience. Instead, they can maintain that the nature of perceptual and hallucinatory experience is the same, while still claiming that perceptual experience is presentational of the objects of perception. On such a view the difference between perceptual and non-percep...
متن کاملInfinitism, finitude and normativity
I evaluate two new objections to an infinitist account of epistemic justification, and conclude that they fail to raise any new problems for infinitism. The new objections are a refined version of the finite-mind objection, which says infinitism demands more than finite minds can muster, and the normativity objection, which says infinitism entails that we are epistemically blameless in holding ...
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A reductive analysis of a concept decomposes it into more basic constituent parts. Metaethicists today are in almost unanimous agreement that normative language and concepts cannot be reductively analyzed into entirely nonnormative language and concepts. Basic normative concepts are widely thought to be primitive or elemental in our thought, and therefore to admit of no further (reductive) expl...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Philosophia
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0048-3893,1574-9274
DOI: 10.1007/s11406-018-9984-7