Normativity, Epistemic Rationality, and Noisy Statistical Evidence
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Previous articleNext article No AccessNormativity, Epistemic Rationality, and Noisy Statistical EvidenceBoris Babic, Anil Gaba, Ilia Tsetlin, Robert WinklerBoris Babic Search for more articles by this author , Gaba Tsetlin Winkler PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited The British Journal the Philosophy of Science Just Accepted Society: Society Views: 80Total views on site Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/715196 HistoryAccepted April 30, 2021 PDF download Crossref reports no citing article.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['0007-0882', '1464-3537']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/715196