Normative folk psychology and decision theory
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Against a normative view of folk psychology
Recently Elqayam and Evans (2011) have proposed that researchers studying human thinking should be moving away from normative accounts that specify how we “ought” to reason to a more descriptivist framework that describes how we reason. This is an approach that I very much support. The aim of the present article is to demonstrate how this can be applied to the study of mental state reasoning in...
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This paper disputes the claim that our understanding of others is enabled by a commonsense or ‘folk’ psychology, whose ‘core’ involves the attribution of intentional states in order to predict and explain behaviour. I argue that interpersonal understanding is seldom, if ever, a matter of two people assigning intentional states to each other but emerges out of a context of interaction between th...
متن کاملFolk Psychology
For the last 25 years discussions and debates about commonsense psychology (or “folk psychology,” as it is often called) have been center stage in the philosophy of mind. There have been heated disagreements both about what folk psychology is and about how it is related to the scientific understanding of the mind/brain that is emerging in psychology and the neurosciences. In this chapter we wil...
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Traditional economic decision theory proposes that people behave in certain ways when faced with a well-formulated set of alternatives and information. It is a normative theory; it suggests that people should act according to certain decision rules, but not that they will necessarily do so in reality. The standard assumption is that a person has a utility function over all possible outcomes, wh...
متن کاملFolk Psychology and Phenomenal Consciousness
In studying folk psychology, cognitive and developmental psychologists have mainly focused on how people conceive of non-experiential states such as beliefs and desires. As a result, we know very little about how non-philosophers (or the folk) understand the mental states that philosophers typically classify as being phenomenally conscious. In particular, it is not known whether the folk even t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mind & Language
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0268-1064,1468-0017
DOI: 10.1111/mila.12347