Normalized Range Voting Broadly Resists Control
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
We study sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting (SP-AV), a system proposed by Brams and Sanver [1] and here adjusted so as to coerce admissibility of the votes (rather than excluding inadmissible votes a priori), with respect to procedural control. In such control scenarios, an external agent seeks to change the outcome of an election via actions such as adding/deleting/partitioning ...
متن کاملCopeland Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control
Control and bribery are settings in which an external agent seeks to influence the outcome of an election. Faliszewski et al. [7] proved that Llull voting (which is here denoted by Copeland) and a variant (here denoted by Copeland) of Copeland voting are computationally resistant to many, yet not all, types of constructive control and that they also provide broad resistance to bribery. We study...
متن کاملBucklin Voting is Broadly Resistant to Control
Electoral control models ways of changing the outcome of an election via such actions as adding/deleting/partitioning either candidates or voters. These actions modify an election’s participation structure and aim at either making a favorite candidate win (“constructive control”) or prevent a despised candidate from winning (“destructive control”), which yields a total of 22 standard control sc...
متن کاملSingle Transferable Vote Resists Strategic Voting
We give evidence that Single Tranferable Vote (STV) is computationally resistant to manipulation: It is NP-complete to determine whether there exists a (possibly insincere) preference that will elect a favored candidate, even in an election for a single seat. Thus strategic voting under STV is qualitatively more difficult than under other commonly-used voting schemes. Furthermore, this resistan...
متن کاملLlull and Copeland Voting Broadly Resist Bribery and Control
Control of elections refers to attempts by an agent to, via such actions as addition/deletion/partition of candidates or voters, ensure that a given candidate wins [BTT92]. An election system in which such an agent’s computational task is NP-hard is said to be resistant to the given type of control. The only election systems known to be resistant to all the standard control types are highly art...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theory of Computing Systems
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1432-4350,1433-0490
DOI: 10.1007/s00224-012-9441-0