NORM MANIPULATION, NORM EVASION: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

Norm Manipulation, Norm Evasion: Experimental Evidence

Using an economic bargaining game, we tested for the existence of two phenomena related to social norms, namely norm manipulation – the selection of an interpretation of the norm that best suits an individual – and norm evasion – the deliberate, private violation of a social norm. We found that the manipulation of a norm of fairness was characterized by a self-serving bias in beliefs about what...

Amemiya Norm Equals Orlicz Norm in General*

We present a proof that in Orlicz spaces the Amemiya norm and the Orlicz norm coincide for any Orlicz function ‘p. This gives the answer for an open problem. We also give a description of the Amemiya type for the Mazur-Orlicz F-norm.

Survey Evidence on Conditional Norm Enforcement

We discuss survey evidence on individuals’ willingness to sanction norm violations – such as evading taxes, drunk driving, fare dodging, or skiving off work – by expressing disapproval or social exclusion. Our data suggest that people condition their sanctioning behavior on their belief about the frequency of norm violations. The more commonly a norm violation is believed to occur, the lower th...

Rank, Trace-Norm and Max-Norm

We study the rank, trace-norm and max-norm as complexity measures of matrices, focusing on the problem of fitting a matrix with matrices having low complexity. We present generalization error bounds for predicting unobserved entries that are based on these measures. We also consider the possible relations between these measures. We show gaps between them, and bounds on the extent of such gaps.

The Norm Game - How a Norm Fails