Nonparametric Identification of First-Price Auctions With Non-Separable Unobserved Heterogeneity
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Identification of first-price auctions with non-separable unobserved heterogeneity
We propose a novel methodology for identification of first-price auctions, when bidders’ private valuations are independent conditional on one-dimensional unobserved heterogeneity. We extend the existing literature (Li and Vuong (1998), Krasnokutskaya (2011)) by allowing the unobserved heterogeneity to be nonseparable from bidders’ valuations. Our central identifying assumption is that the dist...
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We propose a novel methodology for nonparametric identification of first-price auction models with independent private values, which allows for one-dimensional auctionspecific unobserved heterogeneity, based on recent results from the econometric literature on nonclassical measurement error in Hu and Schennach (2008). Our approach can accommodate a wide variety of applications in which some loc...
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We propose a novel methodology for nonparametric identification of first-price auction models with independent private values, which accommodates auction-specific unobserved heterogeneity and bidder asymmetries, based on recent results from the econometric literature on nonclassical measurement error in Hu and Schennach (2008). Unlike Krasnokutskaya (2009), we do not require that equilibrium bi...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1677603