Nondual Awareness and Minimal Phenomenal Experience
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Neural correlates of nondual awareness in meditation.
Dualities such as self versus other, good versus bad, and in-group versus out-group are pervasive features of human experience, structuring the majority of cognitive and affective processes. Yet, an entirely different way of experiencing, one in which such dualities are relaxed rather than fortified, is also available. It depends on recognizing, within the stream of our consciousness, the nondu...
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We discuss in some length evidence from the cognitive science suggesting that the representations of objects based on spatiotemporal information and featural information retrieved bottom-up from a visual scene precede representations of objects that include conceptual information. We argue that a distinction can be drawn between representations with conceptual and nonconceptual content. The dis...
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In a recent debate, the views that top-down attention is necessary for consciousness (Cohen et al., 2012a,b) and that consciousness is independent of top-down attention (Tsuchiya et al., 2012) have clashed. Here, we list the overlooked or ignored arguments that should be considered before deciding that consciousness is inevitably the result of attention. The issue of relation of bottom-up atten...
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A central, non-negotiable constraint on any account of phenomenal awareness or experience is that it must be intrinsic to the experiencer, rather than depending on an outside interpretation of its structure or function. When applied to computational accounts of phenomenal awareness that are based on dynamical systems theory, this constraint raises a serious conceptual challenge, namely, the nee...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Frontiers in Psychology
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1664-1078
DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.02087