Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou Bargaining Sets
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Implementing the Mas - Colell Bargaining Set
We provide a mechanism that approximately implements the Mas-Colell bargaining set in subgame perfect equilibrium. The mechanism is based on the definition of the Mas-Colell bargaining set, and respects feasibility in and out of equilibrium. Resumen. Este trabajo propone un mecanismo que implementa aproximadamente el conjunto de negociación de Mas-Colell en equilibrio perfecto en subjuegos. El ...
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We study the equivalence between the MB-set and the core in the general context of games with a measurable space of players. In the first part of the paper, we study the problem without imposing any restriction on the class of games we consider. In the second part, we apply our findings to specific classes of games for which we provide new equivalence results. These include non-continuous conve...
متن کاملEquilibrium computation of the Hart and Mas-Colell bargaining model
The 8-th problem raised by [Hart, S., Mas-Colell, A., 2010. Bargaining and cooperation in strategic form games. Journal of the European Economics Association 8 (1), 7–33], is solved. To be specific, I show that the set of SP equilibria can be determined by a finite number of systems of linear inequalities, which are efficiently solvable when there are two players. This is more or less surprisin...
متن کاملOn the Least Core and the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set
We show that the least core of a TU coalitional game with a finite set of players is contained in the Mas-Colell bargaining set. This result is extended to games with a measurable space of players in which the worth of the grand coalition is at least that of any other coalition in the game. As a consequence, we obtain an existence theorem for the Mas-Colell bargaining set in TU games with a mea...
متن کاملOn the Non-Emptiness of the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set
We introduce an extension of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and construct, by an elaboration on a voting paradox, a superadditive four-person nontransferable utility game whose extended bargaining set is empty. It is shown that this extension constitutes an upper hemicontinuous correspondence. We conclude that the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a non-levelled superadditive NTU game may be empty.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Econometrica
سال: 1997
ISSN: 0012-9682
DOI: 10.2307/2171887