Non-Zero-Sum Stopping Games in Continuous Time

Two Player Non Zero-sum Stopping Games in Discrete Time

We prove that every two player non zero-sum stopping game in discrete time admits an -equilibrium in randomized strategies, for every > 0. We use a stochastic variation of Ramsey Theorem, which enables us to reduce the problem to that of studying properties of -equilibria in a simple class of stochastic games with finite state space.

Stopping Games in Continuous Time

We study two-player zero-sum stopping games in continuous time and infinite horizon. We prove that the value in randomized stopping times exists as soon as the payoff processes are right-continuous. In particular, as opposed to existing literature, we do not assume any conditions on the relations between the payoff processes. We also show that both players have simple ε-optimal randomized stopp...

Non-Zero Sum Games for Reactive Synthesis

In this invited contribution [7], we summarize new solution concepts useful for the synthesis of reactive systems that we have introduced in several recent publications. These solution concepts are developed in the context of non-zero sum games played on graphs. They are part of the contributions obtained in the inVEST project funded by the European Research Council.

Non-zero-sum Dresher inspection games

An inspection game is here a non-cooperative two-person-game between an inspector and an inspectee. It models a situation where the inspector controls the inspectee who has an incentive to violate certain legal obligations. A recent survey of inspection games applied to data verification, for example in nuclear material safeguards, is given in [1]. Dresher [2] described a sequential inspection ...

Repeated Games Non - Zero - Sum of Incomplete