Non-Wage Benefits, Costs of Turnover, and Labor Attachment: Evidence from Russian Firms
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Wage bargaining and turnover costs with heterogeneous labor and asymmetric information
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2006
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.895266